Parties who lose in arbitration often try two familiar arguments on the way to federal court: that the arbitrator rewrote the contract instead of reading it, and that some body of law other than the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) should govern review. On September 10, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit rejected both in Univabs Solutions Private Limited v. The Radiology Group, LLC, an unpublished per curiam decision affirming confirmation of an award [1]. Law360 reported the award at $620,000 [2]. Although the opinion is not precedential, it is a clear restatement of how narrow award review is in the circuit that covers Florida, and it carries drafting lessons for anyone negotiating dispute resolution clauses.

The dispute

Univabs, an Indian company, provided radiology services to The Radiology Group (TRG) from 2012 to 2023 [1]. One of TRG’s managers, who handled finances and vendor payments, was also connected to Univabs [1]. When Univabs demanded arbitration for unpaid services, TRG counterclaimed that the manager had used inside knowledge to overcharge it [1]. The arbitrator read TRG’s operating agreement, which said certain managers could have other business interests and would incur no liability for them, as relieving the manager of fiduciary duties to TRG [1]. The arbitrator denied the counterclaims and ruled for Univabs [1]. The district court confirmed the award and denied TRG’s motion to vacate [1].

The FAA applies unless the contract clearly says otherwise

TRG argued that the services agreement’s choice-of-law clause, which called for Georgia law, brought in the Georgia Arbitration Act [1]. The panel disagreed on two grounds. First, the arbitrator’s preliminary hearing order stated that the AAA rules and the FAA would apply, and nothing in the record showed TRG objected, so the argument was waived [1]. Second, under Gulfstream Aerospace v. Oceltip Aviation, a general choice of state law does not displace the FAA; the clause here specified the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and never mentioned the Georgia statute [1]. The court quoted Gulfstream’s summary: if parties want certain rules to apply to the handling of an arbitration, “the contract must say so clearly and unmistakably. Otherwise, the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) will apply” [1].

Interpretation, not modification

On the merits, TRG argued the arbitrator exceeded his powers under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) by modifying the operating agreement [1]. The panel repeated that the courts’ power to second-guess an arbitrator is limited, describing that standard of review as “among the narrowest known to the law” and that arbitrators do not exceed their powers by making errors, even serious ones [1]. The only question is whether the arbitrator interpreted the agreement or abandoned it [1].

Applying its Wiregrass framework, the court looked for the hallmarks of interpretation: textual analysis, use of evidence of the parties’ intent, and characterization of the task as interpretation [1]. The arbitrator had parsed the provision, contrasted the duties of named managers with those of the unnamed manager, and tied his reading to the parties’ intent [1]. That was interpretation, and the court emphasized in a footnote that its review does not extend to whether the interpretation was correct [1]. It also denied Univabs’s motion for sanctions [1].

What it means for Florida practitioners

Several practical points follow for counsel in Florida, where the Eleventh Circuit hears federal appeals:

• Choice-of-law clauses do not choose arbitration law by default. A party that wants the Florida Arbitration Code, or another state statute, to govern review should name it expressly [1].
• Objections belong in the arbitration. The waiver holding turned on silence when the arbitrator’s scheduling order announced the FAA and AAA rules [1].
• Vacatur is not an appeal. A losing party that disagrees with the arbitrator’s reading of a contract has little room once the award shows real interpretive work [1].

Those limits shape settlement value. When an award is this difficult to disturb, the most meaningful chance to influence the outcome comes before the hearing, through careful clause drafting and a realistic look at the merits. Mediation before or during arbitration gives parties a way to test their positions and keep control of the result, rather than relying on post-award motions that the courts review so narrowly.

Counsel looking for a Florida Supreme Court Certified Circuit Civil Mediator for a commercial or contract dispute can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation.

Sources

1. Univabs Solutions Private Limited v. The Radiology Group, LLC, No. 26-10124 (unpublished), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
2. 11th Circ. Backs $620K Award In Radiology Contract Fight, Law360

General information as of September 11, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

Update, July 28, 2026: OIR’s July 1, 2026 Property Insurance Stability Report updated these figures: Florida’s share of nationwide homeowners insurance lawsuits fell to 41 percent in 2025, as Insurance Business reported on July 23, 2026. See the follow-up article for the new data.

The Florida Office of Insurance Regulation released its Property Insurance Stability Report dated January 1, 2026 [1]. Florida law requires the report every January 1 and July 1, and it must address, among other things, the litigation practices and outcomes of insurance companies [1]. The latest edition shows property insurance litigation continuing to decline, and it offers useful data for attorneys, adjusters and parties deciding how and when to resolve disputed claims.

The Reforms Behind the Numbers

The report attributes the market’s direction to a series of legislative changes: 2019 legislation curbing assignment of benefits litigation, SB 76 in 2021, SB 2-D and SB 2-A in 2022, and HB 837 in 2023 [1]. HB 837, approved by the Governor on March 24, 2023 [2], repealed Florida’s one-way attorney fee statutes with certain exceptions and provided that a contingency fee multiplier is appropriate only in a rare and exceptional circumstance [1]. Separately, a party must now submit a notice of intent to initiate litigation before suing a property insurer, and SB 2-D allows an insurer to recover fees and costs for obtaining a dismissal when that notice was not provided at least 10 days before suit [1].

What the Litigation Data Shows

Several measures point the same way:

• Florida’s share of national suits. Florida accounted for 79.16% of nationwide homeowners’ insurance suits in 2020 and 71.59% in 2023, while representing 9.73% of nationwide homeowners’ claims in 2023 [1].
• Service of process filings. Personal residential lawsuits served through the Department of Financial Services fell 23% from 2023 to 2024, and the first eleven months of 2025 showed a 26% decrease compared with the same period in 2024 [1].
• Defense costs. Average defense and cost containment expense per claim fell from $992.89 in 2022 to $817.64 in 2024 [1].

The market indicators followed. For residential policies effective in 2024 or later, 39 companies requested a rate decrease and 100 requested no change [1]. The number of companies under enhanced monitoring fell to 14, from 17 in the July 2025 report [1].

The Cost of a Litigated Claim and South Florida Premiums

The most useful figures for anyone evaluating a disputed claim come from the report’s closed claim data. Insurers reported 698,742 claims closed in 2024, of which 60,261 were litigated and 621,154 were not [1]. Average loss adjustment expense was $12,701 for litigated claims compared with $1,778 for non-litigated claims [1]. Across all perils, insurers took an average of 57 days to close a claim, with a median of 27 days [1].

That gap is the economic case for early resolution. Every dollar spent on adjusting and defending a litigated claim is a dollar not available to settle it. Fewer lawsuits do not eliminate disputes over scope, causation or valuation; they change where and how those disputes are resolved.

The report’s county data shows why claim disputes still carry real stakes in this region. As of September 30, 2025, the average homeowners premium including wind coverage was $6,023 in Miami-Dade County and $6,220 in Broward County [1]. In Miami-Dade, the average condominium unit owner premium including wind was $2,848 [1]. Policyholders paying those amounts expect claims to be handled promptly, and insurers face pressure to control costs.

Practical takeaways for claim professionals:

• Resolve valuation disputes early. The report’s expense data suggests that a dispute resolved before litigation costs a fraction of one resolved after suit [1].
• Use the pre-suit notice period productively. The notice of intent requirement [1] creates a defined window to exchange estimates and documentation before suit.
• Prepare for mediation as if the file were going to trial. With fee shifting narrowed [1], each side carries more of its own cost, which makes a realistic risk assessment at mediation more valuable.

Counsel and adjusters looking for a certified mediator for a property insurance dispute can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation by Zoom statewide.

Sources

1. Property Insurance Stability Report, January 1, 2026, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation
2. CS/CS/HB 837 (2023): Civil Remedies, The Florida Senate
3. Florida homeowners insurance lawsuit share drops to 41% after reform push, Insurance Business

General information as of July 28, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

On July 2, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court decided Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen and held that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) requires apportionment of a joint proposal for settlement even when the proposal concerns a “unified, single claim” [1]. The Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision and approved the Second District’s approach in Cobb v. Durando [1][2]. For counsel who use proposals for settlement to set up mediation and trial, the message is that the apportionment requirement has no case-by-case exceptions.

The facts

Wolfgang and Nadja Mackensen, who are married, engaged the design firm Trace Elements to manage the renovation of a Vero Beach home they rent to vacationers [1]. When the firm left the project before finishing, the couple sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the company counterclaimed [1].

Before trial, the Mackensens served a proposal offering to accept a lump sum of $10,000 from Trace Elements in full settlement, with mutual dismissals [1]. Trace Elements rejected it, and the jury awarded the Mackensens $41,273.70 on their contract claim [1]. Section 768.79 generally entitles a plaintiff to fees when the defendant rejects a demand and the plaintiff recovers a judgment at least 25 percent greater than the offer [1]. The trial court nonetheless denied fees because the proposal did not allocate the $10,000 between the two spouses [1].

The Fourth District reversed, reasoning that a joint proposal on a unified, single claim did not need apportionment [1]. That conflicted with Cobb, where the Second District invalidated an unapportioned proposal by married homeowners against a roofing contractor [1].

The holding

Writing for the majority, Justice Muñiz explained that Rule 1.442(c)(3) states that “[a] joint proposal must state the amount and terms attributable to each party,” and that a joint proposal is simply one made by or to multiple parties [1]. The Court pointed to a line of precedent that has invalidated unapportioned proposals in many settings, including offers by two plaintiffs, offers to two defendants and cases of purely vicarious liability [1]. In identifying a joint proposal, the Court said, it has never looked beyond the number of parties; the parties’ relationships, theories of liability and the nature of their claims have been irrelevant [1].

The majority also stressed predictability. Consistent application of the rule lets parties rely on a stable framework instead of guessing whether a statutory purpose will excuse noncompliance [1]. Because the Mackensens’ proposal came from two distinct plaintiffs and did not allocate the lump sum, it was invalid [1].

The vote was 4 to 3. Chief Justice Couriel and Justices Labarga and Grosshans joined the majority, and Justice Sasso dissented, joined by Justices Francis and Tanenbaum [1]. The dissent argued that the damages of a married couple with an undifferentiated claim could not logically be divided, and cited earlier cases describing joint proposals as “a trap for the wary and unwary alike” [1]. As with any new opinion, the decision was not final until the time to seek rehearing expired [1].

Practical points for counsel and mediators

• Count the parties, not the claims. If a proposal comes from or goes to more than one party, the majority’s reasoning calls for a stated amount and terms for each one [1].
• Spouses and co-owners are not an exception. Married plaintiffs with a single contract claim were held to the same rule [1].
• Audit proposals already served. Fee exposure in pending cases may turn on whether an earlier proposal was properly apportioned, which can shift settlement leverage at mediation.
• Expect the issue to surface in negotiations. Where a proposal’s validity is doubtful, parties often discount the fee claim it supports. A mediator can help both sides test that risk candidly in caucus.

Proposals for settlement remain one of the most effective tools for moving a case toward resolution, but only if they are drafted to survive a challenge. Counsel looking for a Florida Supreme Court Certified Circuit Civil Mediator can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation by Zoom statewide.

Sources

1. Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen, No. SC2024-1274, Supreme Court of Florida
2. Trace Elements, Inc. v. Mackensen (Fla. 2026), Justia

General information as of July 7, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

On May 28, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock and ruled that a driver who handles only the in-state portion of a shipment’s interstate trip may still fall within the Federal Arbitration Act’s Section 1 exemption, even if the driver never leaves the state or deals with vehicles that cross its borders [1][2]. The decision was unanimous, with Justice Gorsuch writing for the Court [3]. For counsel who handle wage, classification and contract disputes with delivery workers, the ruling means more of those cases may land in court, and in court-ordered mediation, rather than in private arbitration.

The facts and the holding

Flowers Foods produces packaged baked goods at bakeries in 19 states and relies in part on franchisees who buy distribution rights in specific territories [1]. Angelo Brock, a franchisee serving the Denver area, picked up products from a Colorado warehouse and delivered them to local stores without leaving the state [1]. In 2022 he sued, alleging that the company underpaid him and other distributors in violation of federal and state law [1]. Flowers moved to compel arbitration under his distribution agreement; the district court denied the motion and the Tenth Circuit affirmed [1].

Section 1 of the FAA carves out the employment agreements of any class of workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce” [1]. Flowers urged a categorical test: no worker could be exempt without personally crossing a state border or working with vehicles that make such crossings [1]. The Court rejected that rule. Reading the words as they were understood when the FAA was enacted, it concluded that interstate commerce covers an unbroken shipment that starts in one state and finishes in another, even when most of the trip happens inside one state’s borders [1]. The Court also relied on historical precedent, including The Daniel Ball, which treated a steamer operating entirely within Michigan as engaged in interstate commerce because it carried goods moving to or from other states [1].

What the Court left open

The opinion is narrow in important ways. Flowers suggested other reasons Brock might fall outside Section 1, including that the agreement ran with his independently operated business rather than with him personally, and that he bought and took title to the goods before reselling them [1]. The Court noted that lower courts have treated facts like these as relevant, but declined to decide their significance because Flowers did not squarely present them [1]. Commentators have also emphasized that the decision does not make all local delivery work exempt; drivers whose work is entirely local and unconnected to goods moving across state lines remain outside the exemption [3].

Foley Hoag describes Flowers as the fourth decision in recent years to expand Section 1, following New Prime v. Oliveira (2019), Southwest Airlines v. Saxon (2022) and Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries (2024) [3].

Practical effects for dispute resolution

When the exemption applies, employers cannot rely on the FAA to compel these workers to arbitrate, so their claims can stay in court [3]. For distributor, franchise and gig-based delivery models, that shifts negotiating leverage. Brock’s own suit alleged underpayment of both him and other distributors [1], and claims of that kind that companies expected to resolve in private arbitration may now proceed on a court docket.

For mediation, several points follow:

• Threshold motions shape timing. A contested motion to compel can hold a case in place for months. Where the exemption plainly applies after Flowers, parties may reach the merits, and a mediated resolution, sooner.
• The open questions are bargaining issues. Whether a franchise agreement with a business entity is a “contract of employment,” and whether taking title to goods ends the interstate journey, remain unresolved at the Supreme Court [1]. Those uncertainties carry real litigation risk for both sides and belong in any settlement analysis.
• Agreements may be redrafted. Foley Hoag advises employers to review whether arbitration agreements with these workers remain enforceable [3], and any redraft is an opportunity to consider a mediation step before litigation.

Federal courts in Florida, like all courts, must apply the Court’s reading of Section 1. Counsel facing a motion to compel in light of Flowers will want to assess the worker’s role in the interstate chain at the outset.

Counsel looking for a certified mediator for an employment or commercial dispute can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation by Zoom statewide.

Sources

1. Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, No. 24-935 (Slip Opinion), Supreme Court of the United States
2. Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
3. Supreme Court Expands FAA Exemption to Local Delivery Drivers in Interstate Supply Chains, Foley Hoag LLP

General information as of June 3, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, holding that a federal court that has stayed claims pending arbitration under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitral award under Sections 9 and 10 [1]. The decision was unanimous, with Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing for the Court [2]. For counsel who handle disputes that move between litigation, arbitration and mediation, the ruling removes a jurisdictional question that had complicated the end of many federal cases.

The facts and the question presented

Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles from 2017 until his employment ended in March 2020 [1]. He sued in federal district court in New York, alleging discrimination under federal and state law [1]. Citing an arbitration agreement he signed before starting work, the employer moved to stay the case pending arbitration, and the district court granted the stay [1].

The arbitrator ruled against Jules on all claims and awarded about $34,500 in sanctions to the employer [1]. When the employer returned to the same district court to confirm the award, Jules cross-moved to vacate and argued that the court lacked jurisdiction [1]. He relied on Badgerow v. Walters, a 2022 decision holding that federal courts will not entertain a freestanding suit to confirm or vacate an award unless the application itself shows an independent basis for federal jurisdiction [1][2]. The district court confirmed the award, and the Second Circuit affirmed [1].

The Court’s reasoning

The Court distinguished freestanding applications, like those in Badgerow and the earlier Vaden v. Discover Bank, from motions filed in a case that is already pending in federal court [1][2]. In a pre-existing case, the court does not need to “look through” to the underlying dispute because it can assess jurisdiction by looking at the suit already before it [1]. The district court had original federal-question jurisdiction over Jules’s federal claims, and nothing in the FAA divests a court of jurisdiction over those claims while arbitration is pending [1]. Post-arbitration motions, the Court explained, are part of resolving the stayed claims [1].

As SCOTUSblog’s analysis put it, the opinion “firmly validated the authority of federal courts to enforce arbitration awards made in cases already pending in federal court” [2].

Practical takeaways for counsel and mediators

The holding is limited to cases where the federal court had original jurisdiction over the claims and stayed them under Section 3 [1]. Within that frame, several practical points follow:

• Stay versus dismissal matters. A case that is stayed rather than dismissed remains before the court, which supports jurisdiction over later motions to confirm or vacate [1]. Counsel who expect to need a federal forum after arbitration should consider that when the motion to compel is briefed.
• Freestanding applications remain governed by Badgerow. Parties who arbitrate without a prior federal suit still need an independent jurisdictional basis to go to federal court with a Section 9 or Section 10 application [1][2].
• Settlement leverage shifts slightly. When both sides know the forum for confirming an award is settled, arguments about post-award jurisdiction carry less weight in negotiations, and the discussion can focus on the merits and the cost of continuing.

Mediation often runs alongside or before arbitration in employment, construction and commercial matters. A clear understanding of where an award can be enforced helps counsel advise clients about the realistic value of settling at mediation versus pressing on to an award and a confirmation fight.

Counsel looking for a certified mediator can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation online, by Zoom statewide.

Sources

1. Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, 608 U.S. ___ (2026), Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center
2. Justices validate authority of federal courts to confirm arbitration awards, at least in cases already in federal court, SCOTUSblog

General information as of May 19, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

On February 24, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court decided The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, a unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor with a concurrence by Justice Thomas [1]. The question was narrow but consequential: if a federal district court wrongly dismisses the only nondiverse defendant after removal, can the resulting judgment survive because the parties were diverse by the end of the case? The Court said no [1]. The judgment must be vacated, and in this case the litigation goes back to state court [2].

The Case

Sarah and Grant Palmquist fed their son baby food made by Hain Celestial Group and bought from Whole Foods Market [1]. After the child developed serious developmental disorders that some doctors attributed to heavy-metal poisoning, the family sued both companies in Texas state court, accusing Hain of negligence and product liability and accusing Whole Foods of negligence and breach of warranty [1].

Hain, which is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, removed the case on diversity grounds [1]. Complete diversity was missing, however, because Whole Foods and the Palmquists were all Texas citizens [1]. Hain argued that Whole Foods had been improperly joined. The district court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, denied remand and tried the case against Hain alone, then granted Hain judgment as a matter of law for lack of causation evidence [1]. The Fifth Circuit reversed the improper-joinder ruling, held that the Palmquists had plausibly alleged claims against Whole Foods, vacated the judgment and ordered the case remanded to state court [1]. The Supreme Court took the case to resolve a split among the circuits [1].

The Holding

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and an appellate court must confirm the lower court’s jurisdiction as well as its own [1]. If the district court lacked jurisdiction when a case was filed or removed, any merits judgment generally must be vacated [1]. The one relevant exception, from Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, applies when the district court cures the defect before final judgment, as when the nondiverse party in that case settled and was dismissed with all parties’ consent [1].

That exception did not help Hain. The dismissal of Whole Foods was wrong and interlocutory, so it merged into the final judgment and was open to review [1]. When the Fifth Circuit reversed it, Whole Foods was back in the case, complete diversity was gone, and the defect “lingered through judgment” [1]. The Court rejected the argument that the parties’ diversity at judgment was enough, noting that it has never held a district court can create jurisdiction through its own mistakes [1]. It also held that the efficiency concerns in Caterpillar cannot excuse an uncured jurisdictional defect [1].

Finally, the Court refused to let Hain use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 to drop Whole Foods on appeal [1]. A defendant cannot use that rule to override the plaintiff’s choice of a state forum, and the Palmquists had properly joined a nondiverse defendant and promptly moved to remand [1]. SCOTUSblog’s summary was that, because the trial court never had jurisdiction, the entire case returns to state court [2].

What It Means for Case Valuation and Settlement

The practical lesson is about risk that sits underneath the merits. After Palmquist, a defense win in federal court that depends on an improper-joinder ruling stays exposed until that ruling survives appeal [1]. Here, the defendants won at trial and still faced a new proceeding in state court [2].

That changes the math in mediation:

• Defense counsel evaluating a removed case built on improper joinder should weigh the chance that a favorable result, even after trial, will be vacated if the joinder ruling is reversed [1].
• Plaintiffs’ counsel who promptly moved to remand and preserved the issue may have more leverage than a federal loss suggests, because a reversal on joinder unwinds the judgment [1].
• Both sides should account for the cost and delay of starting over in state court when comparing a settlement number with the expected value of continued litigation.

Jurisdictional risk rarely appears in a damages spreadsheet, but it can be the issue that decides whether years of litigation count. Palmquist makes it a factor worth putting on the table early.

Counsel looking for a Florida Supreme Court Certified Circuit Civil Mediator for a removed or remanded case can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation.

Sources

1. The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist, No. 24-724, Supreme Court of the United States
2. Justices send litigation about tainted baby food back to state court, SCOTUSblog

General information as of February 27, 2026, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.

Arbitration clauses are often drafted to narrow disputes as much as possible: individual claims only, no class or representative relief, limited remedies. On December 15, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit showed where that strategy can fail. In Williams v. Shapiro, a published opinion, the court formally adopted the effective vindication doctrine and held that an arbitration provision was unenforceable because it barred plan participants from seeking the plan-wide relief that ERISA authorizes [1]. For counsel who draft, enforce or negotiate around dispute resolution clauses in Florida, the decision is a useful reminder that limiting the forum is different from limiting the remedy.

The Facts

A360, Inc. created an employee stock ownership plan that bought all of the company’s stock for $30 million in 2017 [1]. In September 2019, the plan’s shares were sold for about $34.6 million, and at the same time the company amended the plan document to add an “ERISA Arbitration and Class Action Waiver” [1]. That procedure required every claim to be brought individually and barred any remedy that would provide relief to anyone other than the individual claimant [1]. It also stated that if a court found those requirements unenforceable, the entire arbitration procedure would be “null and void in all respects” [1]. Five days later, the plan was terminated [1].

Participants later sued under ERISA, seeking to represent a class of about 280 participants and alleging that the stock was worth roughly $70 million, so the plan lost $35.4 million [1]. They sought plan-wide relief, including disgorgement, restitution and rescission [1]. The district court in the Northern District of Georgia denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and the defendants appealed [1][2].

The Holding

The panel, which included Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell of the Middle District of Florida sitting by designation, affirmed [1]. Several points stand out:

• The doctrine is binding in the circuit. The defendants argued that the effective vindication doctrine is judge-made and rests on Supreme Court dicta [1]. The court acknowledged that neither it nor the Supreme Court had previously used the doctrine to strike an arbitration provision, but it concluded that the Supreme Court’s discussion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant could not be dismissed as mere dicta, and it adopted and applied the doctrine [1].
• Forum versus substance. Citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, the court explained that the Federal Arbitration Act does not require enforcement of contractual waivers of substantive rights and remedies [1]. A party agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim submits to a different forum but does not give up the statute’s substantive rights [1].
• Plan-wide relief is a substantive right. Because the procedure barred representative claims for relief benefiting anyone other than the claimant, it prevented participants from vindicating their ERISA rights to plan-wide relief [1]. A later amendment allowing limited injunctive relief did not cure the problem, because it still excluded plan-wide monetary relief such as disgorgement and restitution [1].
• The non-severability clause backfired. Severability is a question of state law, and under Georgia law the parties’ intent controls [1]. Because the drafters made the whole procedure void if its limits were struck, the court invalidated the entire arbitration procedure [1].

The court noted that it joined sister circuits, and that six circuits had applied the doctrine to ERISA waivers in the past five years, with none rejecting it [1].

Takeaways for Dispute Resolution Practice

• Draft the forum, not the remedy. A clause that sends claims to arbitration may be enforceable. A clause that strips a remedy Congress provided invites the effective vindication challenge that succeeded here [1].
• Think twice about poison pills. Drafters sometimes include all-or-nothing language to avoid class arbitration. In Williams, that language meant the defendants lost arbitration entirely [1].
• Expect the argument beyond ERISA. The opinion addressed ERISA, but its reasoning rests on general Supreme Court principles about statutory remedies [1]. Counsel litigating motions to compel in other statutory contexts should anticipate similar arguments.
• Use the uncertainty. When enforceability of an arbitration clause is contested, the forum fight itself becomes costly. Mediation can let parties resolve the merits, or at least the forum question, without spending a year on motions and appeals.

Counsel looking for a certified mediator for a contract, employment or business dispute can check Tony Roca’s live availability and book a mediation by Zoom statewide.

Sources

1. Williams v. Shapiro, No. 24-11192 (11th Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
2. Williams v. Shapiro (11th Cir. 2025), Justia

General information as of December 22, 2025, not legal advice. Originally published at LexBrief Insights by Tony Roca, The Roca Law Firm, P.A., Miami, Florida.